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MEMBANGUNKAN SOALAN ANTI-KEGANASAN DAN KEBERKESANAN 
PRPOGRAM PENDIDIKAN ANTI-KEGANASAN TERHADAP 
KESIAPSIAGAAN, REAKSI DAN KESANGGUPAN DIKALANGAN RAKYAT 
MALAYSIA 
ABSTRAK 
 Keganasan sekarang telah menjadi perkara biasa di banyak tempat di seluruh 
dunia dan  kini menular ke Malaysia. Perkembangan terkini telah menyaksikan keganasan 
berkembang dalam kerumitannya sejajar dengan perkembangan teknologi. Kini ia 
mengancam kesejahteraan kehidupan masyarakat. Kajian ini dimulakan dengan 
membangun dan mengesahkan set soalan ( TeRRW) untuk menilai tahap kesediaan, 
tindak balas dan kesanggupan orang awam terhadap antikeganasan. Kebolehpercayaan 
dalaman yang konsisten berdasarkan kepada nilai Cronbach’s alpha adalah melebihi 0.70 
(dari 0.730 hingga 0.883) dan ini menunjukkan bahawa TeRRW adalah sah untuk menilai 
tahap kesediaan, tindak balas dan kesanggupan orang awam terhadap antikeganasan. 
Kemudian diikuti dengan membangunkan program pendidikan antikeganasan yang 
berdasarkan kepada keperluan masyarakat setempat. Dengan menggunakan bahan-bahan 
ini, kajian rentas dan intervensi komuniti yang melibatkan 400 penduduk Kota Bharu dan 
daerah Gua Musang telah dijalankan dalam tempoh setahun dari Januari 2017 sehingga 
Disember 2017. TeRRW bertujuan untuk mengenal pasti dan menilai status kesediaan, 
tindak balas dan kesanggupan terhadap antikeganasan dalam masyarakat. Kesan faktor 
sosiodemografi terhadap tiga domain ini juga turut di analisis. Daripada 400 responden, 
hanya 250 (62.5%) menunjukkan tindak balas dan 150 (37.5%) tidak bertindak balas dan 
hanya memperlihatkan faktor bangsa atau etnik dan kategori pekerjaan yang 
 xviii 
mempengaruhi keputusan di atas. Intervensi masyarakat menggunakan program 
pendidikan antipengganas menunjukkan bahawa ketiga-tiga domain tersebut telah 
berubah dengan signifikan.  Program yang dibangunkan untuk mendidik dan 
mendedahkan orang ramai terhadap antikeganasan di kalangan masyarakat tempatan 
didapati berkesan tetapi kesanya menurun dalam masa yang singkat. Kajian ini 
merumuskan bahawa respon komuniti terhadap program pendidikan antikeganasan adalah 
positif dalam mendidik dan mendedahkan orang ramai terhadap antikeganasan tetapi 
perlulah dijalankan secara berkala untuk memaksimumkan kesannya. Program seperti ini 
dipercayai dapat meningkatkan tahap kewaspadaan masyarakat terhadap keganasan di 
Malaysia. 
 
Kata kunci: soalan antikeganasan, program pendidikan antikeganasan, kesiapsiagaan, 










ANTI-TERRORISM QUESTIONNAIRE DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION PROGRAMME ON MALAYSIA PUBLIC 
READINESS, REACTION AND WILLINGNESS 
ABSTRACT 
Terrorism nowadays has become common in many parts of the world and it is 
slowly coming to Malaysia. Recent developments have seen terrorism evolved in its 
complexity with the age of information and technology.  It now threatens the well-being 
of innocent life and civil society. This study was initiated by developing and validating a 
questionnaire, namely TeRRW to access the level of readiness, reaction and willingness 
among the Malaysia public towards antiterrorism. The internal consistency reliability 
based on the value of Cronbach’s alpha of TeRRW questionnaire was above 0.70 (ranging 
from 0.730 to 0.883) and this showed that questionnaire is valid to access the public 
perception towards terrorism. Then followed with the development of an anti-terrorism 
educational material which was based on local needs. Using these materials, a cross-
sectional study and community intervention involving 400 residents from Kota Bharu and 
Gua Musang districts was conducted within a year from January 2017 until December 
2017. The TeRRW questionnaire aims to identify and evaluate the status of readiness, 
reaction and willingness against terrorism in the community. The association of 
sociodemographic factors with these three domains were also analyzed. Out of 400 
respondents, only 250 (62.5%) showed a reaction and 150 (37.5%) did not react and it 
further showed only race or ethnicity and job category were found to be significantly 
associated with those results. The community intervention using anti-terrorism 
educational material analysis showed that these three domains changed significantly after 
 xx 
an intervention was conducted. The anti-terrorism educational material developed to 
educate and expose the public towards antiterrorism among local communities were found 
to be effective, but the impacts were decreased within time. This study concluded that the 
community response towards intervention of antiterrorism such as anti-terrorism 
educational material was positive to educate and expose the public towards antiterrorism 
but need to be done in a schedule in order to maximize the impact. This kind of program 
could increase community alertness level towards terrorism in Malaysia.    
 









1.1 The Chronicle of terrorism 
The literature review reveals that the earliest known organization that exhibited 
aspects of a modern terrorist organization was the Zealots of Judea. Known to the 
Romans as Sicarii or dagger-men, their main function was to carry an underground 
campaign of assassination of Roman occupation forces, as well as any Jews they felt 
had collaborated with the Romans (Birnbaum and Roger, 2011; Cutter et al., 2004). 
Their motive was an uncompromising belief that they could not remain faithful to the 
dictates of Judaism while living as Roman subjects. Eventually, the Zealot revolt 
became open, and they were finally besieged and committed mass suicide at the 
fortification of Masada (Cutter et al., 2004).  
 
The Assassins was the next group to show recognizable characteristics of 
terrorism, as we know it today. The Assassins is a comprehensive, readable and 
authoritative account of history's first terrorists. An offshoot of the Ismaili Shi'ite sect 
of Islam, the Assassins were the first group to make systematic use of murder as a 
political weapon (Birnbaum and Roger, 2011). Established in Iran and Syria in the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries, they aimed to overthrow the existing Sunni order in 
Islam and replace it with their own. They terrorized their foes with a series of dramatic 
murders of Islamic leaders, as well as of some of the crusaders, who brought their 
name and fame back to Europe (Carter et al., 1998). This radical group, studying its 
teachings and its influence on Muslim thought. Particularly insightful considering the 
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rise of the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and in Israel, this account of the Assassins, 
whose name is now synonymous with politically motivated murderers places recent 
events in historical perspective and sheds new light on the fanatic mind (Carter et al., 
1998). A breakaway faction of Shia Islam called the Nizari Ismailis adopted the tactic 
of the assassination of enemy leaders because the cult's limited manpower prevented 
open combat. Their leader, Hassam-I Sabbah, based the cult in the mountains of 
Northern Iran. Their tactic of sending a lone assassin to successfully kill a key enemy 
leader at the certain sacrifice of his own life (the killers waited next to their victims to 
be killed or captured) inspired fearful awe in their enemies (Aksoy et al., 2015; 
Alexander, 2002). Even though both the Zealots and the Assassins operated in 
antiquity and occurred during 1st – 14th century AD, their tactics are still relevant today. 
First as forerunners of modern terrorists in aspects of motivation, organization, 
targeting, and goals. Secondly, although both were ultimate failures, the fact that they 
are remembered hundreds of years later demonstrates the deep psychological impact 
they caused.  
 
The phenomenon of brutality keeps extending and expanding from time to 
time. In the early 14th to 18th century, terror and barbarism were widely used in warfare 
and conflict but key ingredients for terrorism were lacking. Until the rise of the modern 
nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 also known as the time where the 
early origins of terrorism begin (Alexander, 2002). The sort of central authority and 
cohesive society that terrorism attempts to influence barely existed. Communications 
were inadequate and controlled, and the causes that might inspire terrorism (religious 
schism, insurrection, ethnic strife) typically led to open warfare. By the time kingdoms 
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and principalities became nations, they had sufficient means to enforce their authority 
and suppress activities such as terrorism.  
 
The French Revolution provided the first uses of the words "Terrorist" and 
"Terrorism". Use of the word "terrorism" began in 1795 about the Reign of Terror 
initiated by the Revolutionary government. The agents of the Committee of Public 
Safety and the National Convention that enforced the policies of "The Terror" were 
referred to as 'Terrorists" (Alexander and Klein, 2005). The French Revolution 
provided an example to future states in oppressing their populations. It also inspired a 
reaction by royalists and other opponents of the Revolution who employed terrorist 
tactics such as assassination and intimidation in resistance to the Revolutionary agents. 
The Parisian mobs played a critical role at key points before, during, and after the 
Revolution. Such extra-legal activities as killing prominent officials and aristocrats in 
gruesome spectacles started long before the guillotine was first used.  
 
During the modern era (19th century), radical political theories and 
improvements in weapons technology spurred the formation of small groups of 
revolutionaries who effectively attacked nation-states (Abraham et al., 2012). 
Anarchists espousing belief in the "propaganda of the deed" produced some striking 
successes, assassinating heads of state from Russia, France, Spain, Italy and the United 
States. However, their lack of organization and refusal to cooperate with other social 
movements in political efforts rendered anarchists ineffective as a political movement. 
In contrast, Communism's role as an ideological basis for political terrorism was just 




Another trend in the late 19th century was the increasing tide of nationalism 
throughout the world, in which the nation (the identity of a people) and the political 
state were combined. As states began to emphasize national identities, peoples that had 
been conquered or colonized could, like the Jews at the times of the Zealots, decide 
for assimilation or struggle. The best-known nationalist conflict from this time is still 
unresolved such as the multi-century struggle of Irish nationalism. Nationalism, like 
communism, became a much greater ideological force in the 20th century (Abraham 
et al., 2012). The terrorist group from this period that serves as a model in many ways 
for what was to come was from Russian and known as Narodnya Volya (Peoples Will). 
They differed in some ways from modern terrorists, especially in that they would 
sometimes call off attacks that might endanger individuals other than their intended 
target (Aradau and Van Munster, 2012). Other than this quirk, we see many of the 
traits of terrorism here for the first time; clandestine, cellular organization; impatience 
and inability for the task of organizing the constituents they claim to represent; and a 
tendency to increase the level of violence as pressures on the group mount.  
 
The first half of the 20th century saw two events that influenced the nature of 
the conflict to the present day. The effects of two World Wars inflamed passions and 
hopes of nationalists throughout the world, and severely damaged the legitimacy of 
the international order and governments. Nationalism intensified during the early 20th 
century throughout the world. It became an especially powerful force in the peoples of 
various colonial empires. Although dissent and resistance were common in many 
colonial possessions, and sometimes resulted in open warfare, nationalist identities 
became a focal point for these actions. Gradually, as nations became closely tied to 
concepts of race and ethnicity, international political developments began to support 
  
5 
such concepts  (Ablah et al., 2006). Members of ethnic groups whose states had been 
absorbed by others or had ceased to exist as separate nations saw opportunities to 
realize nationalist ambitions. Several of these groups chose terror as a method to 
conduct their struggle and make their situation known to world powers they hoped 
would be sympathetic. In Europe, both the Irish and the Macedonians had existing 
terrorist campaigns as part of their ongoing struggle for independence but had to 
initiate bloody uprisings to further their cause. The Irish were partially successful, the 
Macedonians failed. 
 
The "total war" practices of all combatants of world war II (WWII) provided 
further justification for the "everybody does it" view of the use of terror and violations 
of the law of war (Enders and Sandler, 1999). The desensitization of people and 
communities to violence that started in World War I accelerated during World War II. 
The intensity of the conflict between starkly opposed ideologies led to excesses on the 
part of all participants. New weapons and strategies that targeted the enemies' civilian 
population to destroy their economic capacity for conflict exposed virtually every 
civilian to the hazards of combatants (Caruso and Schneider, 2011; Enders et al., 
2006). The major powers' support of partisan and resistance organizations using 
terrorist tactics was viewed as an acceptance of their legitimacy. It seemed that 
civilians had become legitimate targets, despite any rules forbidding it.  
 
The bi-polar world of the Cold War changed the perception of conflicts the 
world over. Relatively minor confrontations took on significance as areas where the 
superpowers could compete without risking escalation to full nuclear war. Warfare 
between the East and the West took place on the peripheries and was limited in scope 
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to prevent escalation. During the immediate postwar period, terrorism was more of a 
tactical choice by leaders of nationalist insurgencies and revolutions. Successful 
campaigns for independence from colonial rule occurred throughout the world and 
many employed terrorisms as a supporting tactic. When terrorism was used, it was 
used within the framework of larger movements, and coordinated with political, social, 
and military action (Anderton and Carter, 2005). Even when terrorism came to 
dominate the other aspects of a nationalist struggle, such as the Palestinian campaign 
against Israel, it was combined with other activities. Throughout the Cold War, the 
Soviet Union provided direct and indirect assistance to revolutionary movements 
around the world (Aradau and Van Munster, 2012). Many anti-colonial movements 
found the revolutionary extremism of communism attractive. Leaders of these "wars 
of national liberation" saw the advantage of free weapons and training. They also 
realized that the assistance and patronage of the Eastern Bloc meant increased 
international legitimacy. Many of these organizations and individuals utilized 
terrorism in support of their political and military objectives. The policy of the Soviet 
Union to support revolutionary struggles everywhere, and to export revolution to non-
communist countries, provided extremists willing to employ violence and terror as the 
means to realize their ambitions (Alexander, 2002; Aradau and Van Munster, 2012).  
 
The age of modern terrorism might be said to have begun in 1968 when the 
Popular Fronts the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) hijacked an El Al airliner en-route 
from Tel Aviv to Rome (Alexander, 2002). While hijackings of airliners had occurred 
before, this was the first time that the nationality of the carrier (Israeli) and its symbolic 
value was a specific operational aim. Also, a first was the deliberate use of the 
passengers as hostages for demands made publicly against the Israeli government. The 
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combination of these unique events, added to the international scope of the operation, 
gained significant media attention. The founder of PFLP, Dr. George Habash observed 
that the level of coverage was tremendously greater than battles with Israeli soldiers 
in their previous area of operations. "At least the world is talking about us 
now." Another aspect of this internationalization is the cooperation between extremist 
organizations in conducting terrorist operations (Feucht et al., 2011). Cooperative 
training between Palestinian groups and European radicals started as early as 1970, 
and joint operations between the PFLP and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) began in 
1974 (Alexander, 2002). Since then international terrorist cooperation in training, 
operations, and support has continued to grow and continues to this day. Motives range 
from the ideological, such as the 1980s alliances of the Western European Marxist-
oriented groups, to financial, as when the Irish Republican Army (IRA) exported its 
expertise in bomb-making as far as to Colombia.  
 
Until today, there are so many definitions given to simplify the term of 
terrorism. A study record for the US army quoted a source that counted 109 definitions 
of the word terrorism (Laqueur, 1996b) that covered a total of 22 difference 
definitional elements. Furthermore, terrorism expert also has counted over 100 
definitions and concludes that the only general characteristic generally agreed upon is 
that terrorism involves violence and the threat of violence  (Laqueur, 1996a). For this 
present study, the researcher adopted the definition which describes the terrorist attack 
as the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence to place the 





 For the last 30 years, thousands of terrorist’s attacks happened worldwide 
resulting in many casualties. Below is a list of high profile terrorist events, which 
happened throughout the world during the period (Van Assche, 2009). The events 
were: 
1. New York City, New York; 1993 
February 26, the first attack of World Trade Center (WTC) took place when a 
truck bomb exploded resulting in 6 people killed and 1043 people needed medical 
attention. Over 50,000 people had to be evacuated which take 12 hours to complete 
and recovery phase took 22 days. 
2. Matsumoto, Japan; 1994 
June 27, a deadly poisoning gas sarin was released by members of Aum 
Shinrikyo from a truck using heater and fan into a civilian residential area which 
killed 7 people. Another 58 victims were admitted to hospital and 600 people had 
to be evacuated, which took almost 5 hours. 
3. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; 1995 
April 19, a truck equipped with ammonium nitrate and fuel detonated in front 
of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. This event caused a partial collapsed of 
the nine-story building and smashed another hundred other building.  A total of 
168 people was killed and over 800 people were wounded. The last live rescue 
occurred 13 hours after a blast and the retrieval phase took 21 days. 
4. Tokyo, Japan; 1995 
March 20, members of Aum Shinrikyo cult released sarin in 5 difference 
subway trains on 3 separate subways lines. Thus, 15 subways were affected and 
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killed 12 persons. More than 5500 individuals sought medical attention at more 
than 200 hospitals and clinics within hours of the incident.  
5. United States of America Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam in 
Tanzania; 1998 
August 7, bombing occurred outside the American Embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.  In Tanzania itself, 12 were killed and 85 injured whereas in Kenya, over 
200 were killed and 4000 people were injured. 
6. New York City, New York; 2001 
September 11, two-hijacked civilian airliners were flown into North and South 
tower of World Trade Center. 2726 were confirmed killed and 1100 people were 
treated for various injuries and complications at 5 local hospitals and a day after.  
7. Arlington, Virginia; 2001 
A hijacked civilian airliner crashed at the Pentagon, 189 were killed and the 
phase of response lasted for 10 days. 
8. U.S. Anthrax Incidents; 2001 
From 4th to November 20, anthrax was disseminated through the postal system 
causing 22 cases of illnesses in 7 locations resulting in 5 deaths. Over 10,000 
people were offered antimicrobial prophylaxis.  
9. Bali, Indonesia; 2002 
October 12, several explosions killed 185 people; hospitalized over 316 people 





The largest act of international terrorism occurred on September 11, 2001 in a 
set of coordinated attacks on the United States of America, where Islamic terrorists 
were accused of hijacking civilian airliners and used them to attack the World Trade 
Centre (WTC) towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington D.C 
(Bulmer-Thomas, 2001). The effects of September 11 had a significant impact on the 
American mentality and led to global reverberations. Other major terrorist attacks have 
also occurred in New Delhi (Indian Parliament building); Bali car bomb attack; 
London subway bombings; Madrid train station bombings; attacks in Mumbai (hotels, 
train station and a Jewish outreach center), Nigeria, Pakistan, Paris, and more (Gray 
and Wilson, 2006). Perhaps, what happened in Indonesia was the nearest major 
activities of terrorism that took place in our region. The 2002 Bali bombings occurred 
on 12 October 2002 in the tourist district of Kuta on the Indonesian island of Bali (The 
Malay Mail Online, 2017). The attack killed 202 people. A further 209 people were 
injured. Members of Jemaah Islamiyah, a violent Islamist group, were convicted in 
relation to the bombings. The attack involved the detonation of three bombs: a 
backpack-mounted device carried by a suicide bomber and a large car bomb, both of 
which were detonated in or near popular nightclubs in Kuta and a third much smaller 
device detonated outside the United States consulate in Denpasar, causing only minor 
damage. Then, in 2005, another series of the terrorist suicide bomb and car bomb 
occurred on 1st October in Bali. The bombs exploded at two sites in Jimbaran Beach 
Resort and in Kuta 30 km away, both in south Bali. The terrorist attack claimed the 
lives of 20 people and injured more than 100 others. The three bombers also died in 
the attacks. All these incidents were traced from the middle east countries where the 
jihadist groups were active. Malaysians had also been recruited by these groups and 
their ideology had already spread among us without we realized it. 
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1.2 Terrorism in Malaysia situation 
Lately, a new trend of disaster caused by human known as a hybrid disaster 
such as war, civil unrest, and terrorism is happening mostly in the Middle East and 
African regions. To be more precise, it was best described as many people trying to do 
as quickly as they can what they do not ordinarily do in the environment which they 
are not familiar with (Wilson, 2001). In Burma, the ongoing crisis in Maungdaw 
district represents the most serious and widespread violence against the Rohingya 
ethnic. This was a campaign of ethnic cleansing carried out in June and October 2012. 
Four years after the 2012 violence, about 120,000 ethnic Rohingya remain displaced 
in camps in Rakhine State (Human Right Watch, 2016). Humanitarian conditions for 
both remaining the internally displaced person (IDPs) and newly resettled persons 
remain dire due to restrictions on movement and lack of access to livelihoods and basic 
services, similar to conflicts in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq.  
 
Based on the above phenomena, it is not impossible for us to experience with 
similar situation. Our country had already experienced several emergency events. 
Below are some examples of major situations that had happened in Malaysia (Fong, 
2005; Wikipedia, 2013): 
1. 13 May 1969. A situation refers to the Sino-Malay sectarian 
conflict in Kuala Lumpur. Based on the report by Time Magazine, 
the event spread throughout the city within 45 minutes. In the end, 
143 of the dead were Chinese and 25 Malays, 439 were recorded 
as injured. 753 cases of arson were logged and 211 vehicles were 
destroyed or severely damaged. 
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2. 19 November 1985. The Memali incident Baling, Kedah. About 
200 policemen under command laid siege to several village houses 
in Memali, in Baling Kedah which consists of 400 people, led by 
Ibrahim Mahmud a.k.a. Ibrahim Libya. The incident resulted in 14 
civilians and 4 policemen dead and 159 people detained, including 
women and children. 
3. 31 July 1988. The collapsed of Penang Ferry Terminal-Jeti 
Pengkalan Sultan Abdul Halim which killed 32 and more than 1674 
people injured. 
4. 7 May 1991. Sungai Buloh fireworks factory explosion that caused 
22 deaths and 103 injured. 
5. 20 June 1992. The oil tanker Choon Hong III at Port Kelang 
explosion resulting in 10 deaths and more than 1000 people 
evacuated from the area. 
6. 11 December 1993. The Highland Tower Condominium collapsed 
with 48 people killed and complete evacuation of another 2 blocks 
of condominium nearby. 
7. 30 June 1995. Landslide at Karak Highway, KM 34 Susur Genting 
Highland that killed 20 tourists and injuring another 22 victims. 
8. 15 July 1996. Landslide accident happed at KM 1.5 Jalan Genting 
Highland and 17 people were killed. 
9. 29 August 1996. Sudden mud flood ravaged Pos Dipang Perak 
killing 44 people and destroyed 30 homes. 
10. 26 December 1996. Typhoon and floods which hit west coast of 
Sabah resulting in 230 people killed and 500 houses destroyed. 
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11. April 2013. The Lahad Datu incident which killed 14 and injured 
3 Malaysian enforcement members. 
 
All the above incidents were not caused directly by terrorist action. The 
incident on 13 May 1969 was an ethnic conflict phenomenon, which was referred to 
as the Sino-Malay sectarian riot in Kuala Lumpur (Tuanku Abdul Rahman, 1972). 
During this incident, as stated by National Operations Council was a result of an 
interaction of several forces. These contain a group breach and differences in 
understanding of the legitimate structure by the different races in the country; the 
agitation, uncontrolled reports and offensive actions of certain racialist party members 
and supporters during the recent General Election; the part played by the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) and underground citizens in seditious racial feelings and 
doubt; and the worried, and later frantic, attitude of the Malays with a background of 
Sino-Malay distrust, and recently, just after the General Elections, as a result of racial 
insults and threat to their future survival in their own country (Tuanku Abdul Rahman, 
1972). This conflict looks like being related to the political environment. This issue is 
still considered as a threat to Malaysia as a country with multi-racial and multi-
religious society. The Lahad Datu tragedy was related to the Mindanao or Philippine 
people trying to invade Malaysia using military force (Muguntan, 2013). These two 
events that happened earlier were close to the art of terrorism already experienced by 
Malaysia public.  
 
Currently, with the ongoing crisis and conflict in the middle east and 
Afghanistan related to religious and political issues, could influence this nation to have 
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a great potential threat. Based on the above scenarios, it is not surprising for Malaysia 
to one day face terrorist threats or social upheaval. On the other hand, with limited 
previous experiences in dealing with such threat, the Malaysia government agencies 
under the Majlis Keselamatan Negara (MKN) and private-sectors organization 
perhaps need to develop the ideal and effective plan to cope or respond to various 
kinds of disaster threat specifically terrorism. Reacting efficiently to such threat are 
very challenging since it involves not only to provide treatment to the injured victims 
but also taking quick action to protect a much larger population who are exposed to 
the risk of further illness or injuries because of the incident (Fong, 2005).   
 
1.3 National disaster management policy in Malaysia  
Nature and economies are the main sources of crises that negatively reflect on 
mankind development throughout the world including Malaysia. To deal with these 
conflicts and problems, the governing body of a society or authorities will make rules 
and orders, duties and directives that every individual should live their lives by but 
until today, several questions are raised when discussing the issue of state disaster 
policy, especially the role of the public in helping the government during the initial 
phase of development of the plan itself (Fong, 2005).  
 
Currently, there were no direct answers to the above questions. The reality is 
the public themselves only had a little or no role at all in helping the government or 
non-government organizations (NGO) in developing a preparedness plan against 
terrorism (Fong, 2005). On top of it, the government of Malaysia previous experiences 
dealing with terrorism was limited, only during the communist insurgency in the early 
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days of the nation building, the Indonesian–Malaysian Confrontation during 1963 to 
1966 (Arkib Negara, 2010), the 13 May 1969 incident referred to the Sino-
Malay sectarian violence in Kuala Lumpur  and the latest was Lahad Datu episode in 
Sabah involving Sulu’s tribe as mentioned before. Based on these scenarios, the action 
plan against terrorism which existed today as claimed by the authority, perhaps being 
developed using assumptions of people reaction towards a similar threat. These 
concepts are totally based on the government policy maker expectations of peoples 
need and anticipated reaction during those crises (Muguntan, 2013).  
 
Most of the expectations or assumptions on public behavior on how people will 
react to emergencies or crisis were basically established by past experiences (Mair, 
2007). Such expectations are those things may not be necessarily correct, perhaps it 
also would be wrong. Dissimilarity among policymaker in the government would be 
another source of ambiguity. Most of the times, they have differences in opinion on 
how the public will respond to a disaster condition. The most concern is the fact that 
the policymaker assumptions about the community reaction during the crisis had often 
been wrong and the impact is very bad to the community (Aradau and Van Munster, 
2007; Aradau and Van Munster, 2008; Birnbaum and Roger, 2011; Bolton, 2015). 
Several examples in the literature proved that public or communities will react 
differently from what the government expected. Furthermore, crisis contingency plan 
of action developed based on miscalculations of how people would react would 
generate more problems rather than the solution themselves (Lemyre et al., 2006; 
Martens and Van den Brande, 2015). For an example, the USA governments failed to 
anticipate the behavior of health care workers in the Centers for Disease Control and 
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Prevention (CDC) Smallpox Vaccination Program. Thus, 4 months after successful 
completion of the program, only 8.5% of the targeted 440,000 health care workers 
were vaccinated (Mack, 2003). 
 
In the Malaysia situation, with minimal previous experiences of terrorist 
incidents, this mistake could also have happened. The best practice is the government 
or planners do not have to speculate what the public concern was or would react in a 
disaster event. They need to identify the significance of plans on the most precise 
evidence potential, leaders involved in terrorist preparation must encourage 
policymakers to acquire material from the public directly (Anderton and Carter, 2005; 
Anderton and Carter, 2006; Aradau and Van Munster, 2007; Aradau and Van Munster, 
2008; Aradau and Van Munster, 2012). The working group on “Governance 
Dilemmas” in Bioterrorism Response, as Julie Gerberding, the former Director of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) stated in a July 2002 interview 
mentioned that in terrorism, certain action needs to be done on ground level by the 
officer themselves and not to speculate by hearing the news (Bhattacharjee, 2006a; 
Bhattacharjee, 2006b; Bhattacharjee, 2008). Using the above concept, the Health 
Campus of Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM) team known as Disaster and Emergency 
Assistant Team (DEMAT) had been actively involved on-ground in disaster relief. The 
DEMAT team have good cooperation with the Malaysian Medical Relief Society 
(MERCY) and was sent to Darfur, Kosovo, Gujarat, Pakistan, Maluku and Cambodia 
in support of humanitarian relief after disaster strikes (Unit Perhubungan Awam, 2005) 




The literature review also revealed that in the Malaysian situation, there is very 
limited information written about disaster preparedness plan pertaining to terrorism. 
The present situation showed that the strength of the chain of disaster management 
preparedness in Malaysia is still unclear. This situation seems to be relatively in-line 
with the way the Malaysian public thinking towards terrorism. As on when, how and 
why they should be involved with this kind of situation were considered not important 
to them at that point in time (Rashidi Ahmad, 2006). The United States of America 
(USA) Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and International Disaster Database, stated that 
for any event to be put in the list of disaster databank, a minimum of one of the 
following criteria below need to be fulfilled (Van Sliedregt and Van Den Herik, 2011): 
1. more than 10 people reported killed 
2. more than 100 people reported affected 
3. international assistance is needed 
4. declaration of an emergency at the state level 
 
1.4 Justification of the study  
In Malaysia situation, the opportunity for Malaysia public to discuss on how 
their response to the Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) or manual during disaster 
event are very rarely discussed especially pertaining to any terrorism (Rashidi Ahmad, 
2006). Thus, the Malaysia public knowledge and experience towards that threat were 
very limited or perhaps none. Previous experiences such as communist insurgency in 
the early days, the Indonesian–Malaysian Confrontation, the Sino-Malay sectarian 
violence in Kuala Lumpur and the latest Lahad Datu episode in Sabah involving the 
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Sulu’s tribe, were still not enough to persuade the Malaysia public to seriously think 
the seriousness of the threat. Terrorism is relatively new for Malaysia people and 
perhaps would not happen within recent years, but somehow, we need to prepare for 
it. This is the appropriate time to address that phenomenon in a good manner. What 
we need is a comprehensive, effective and functioning plan to deal with terrorism. We 
knew very much for the plan to succeed; the public must be involved from the 
beginning and all the way as in its planning and rehearsed as well. Presently, the degree 
of public involvements is very minimal and need to be re-assessed.  
 
Recent developments suggest that Malaysia's jihadist individual was involved 
in terrorism activities internationally especially in the middle east, Philippines, and 
Indonesia. This groups of people had recruited new members to spread their ideology 
in this country and in the region. This latest phenomenon proves that our people were 
already involved with terrorist activities. This threat is evolving and growing 
drastically in a recent year. For examples, on May 8, 2017, the country's national police 
chief announced that Muhammad Wandy Mohamad Jedi, a Malaysian jihadist 
recruiter based in Syria, was killed in an airstrike on Raqqa in late April (Startfor, 
2017). Five days earlier, investigators in the country revealed that they had arrested 
six suspected terrorists over the past month for allegedly smuggling weapons in from 
Thailand, ostensibly in preparation for an attack. The incidents offer a cogent reminder 
that Malaysia is no less susceptible to jihadist violence, despite its relative 
inexperience with it. In fact, its historically low incidence of attacks may prove to be 




The news of Wandy's death could create more opportunities for jihadists 
targeting the country. Wandy, though a prominent and influential jihadist figure in 
Malaysia, wasn't a terribly effective leader. Under his guidance, the Islamic State's 
biggest achievement in Malaysia was an attack on the Movida nightclub near Kuala 
Lumpur on June 28, 2016 (Startfor, 2017). Early that morning, two assailants tossed a 
grenade into a crowd gathered outside the bar, injuring 8 people. The incident was so 
similar to previous criminal acts in the area that police were hesitant to label it a 
terrorist attack until the Islamic State took responsibility for it. The strike involved the 
Islamic State's first in Malaysia was hardly the kind of spectacular, shocking attack 
that terrorists strive for. Police have arrested dozens of suspected Islamic State 
members and have disrupted several attack plots connected to Wandy in the months 
since. In December 2016, authorities detained seven people who were in contact with 
Wandy for allegedly conducting surveillance on an international school in preparation 
for an attack. The suspects were also planning attacks against entertainment venues in 
Kuala Lumpur and Malacca. Their modus operandi targets were similar to the Movida 
bar. By the time police disrupted the plots, they were still in the early stages of the 
attack cycle. Few weapons were seized, suggesting that the plotters hadn't made it past. 
Early interception is ideal for counterterrorism forces because it reduces the risk of 
violence. And in this case, it suggests that authorities were monitoring Wanndy's 
communications with his followers in Malaysia. Investigators knew that Wandy was 
using the Telegram chat app to reach the suspects and routinely cited their 
correspondence with him. In addition, Malaysian authorities appear to have been using 
aggressive intelligence collection to identify his co-conspirators in Malaysia while 




The United States added the Malaysian jihadist leader to its Specially 
Designated Global Terrorists list in late March, and a month later, he was allegedly 
killed in a targeted drone strike (Startfor, 2017). Malaysia, like most Southeast Asian 
countries, heavily regulates firearms and gun violence is rare. Even so, those with the 
right connections can access firearms on the black market. Southern Thai 
rebels allegedly supplied the suspected jihadists with weapons. Though Malaysian and 
Thai authorities aggressively patrol their shared border, where an insurgency has been 
raging sporadically since 1948, they can't possibly stop everything. The aspiring 
attackers managed to exploit a blind spot in intelligence collection to procure weapons, 
advancing their plot further in the attack cycle than other jihadists in the country got 
in their own planning. Of course, authorities thwarted the attack nonetheless. But just 
because previous plots have been detected and averted doesn't mean future attacks will 
also fail. Replacing Wanndy could be the change Malaysian jihadists need to succeed. 
The country, after all, is home to a relatively open society rife with soft targets. 
Furthermore, its ethnic diversity creates the same kinds of political rifts that terrorists 
have exploited in other predominantly Muslim countries. And given the rarity of 
terrorist attacks in Malaysia, even a modest strike there would likely attract the level 
of media and political attention that assailants desire. Indonesia, by contrast, took 
the attack in Jakarta in January 2016 in stride, having weathered far more severe 
strikes in the previous decade. No matter the shortcomings among Malaysia's jihadist 
groups, they have capabilities enough to sow terror in the country. The figure below 




Figure 1: Recent militant activities in Malaysia 
 
Based on the above example, it showed that the terrorist activities in this 
country need a serious attention from the authority. Furthermore, they need to address 
well to avoid further impact on our society.  In order to do that, the public perception 
of readiness, reaction, and willingness towards terrorism need to be reviewed.  
Currently, the plan or perhaps SOP that were already established to face such kinds of 
disaster conditions especially terrorism basically rely on government policymaker 
expectations on what people needed or concerned and how they will react to those 
events. All these expectations may be based on a previous limited experience of 
against terrorist activities as mentioned before. If the Malaysian government 
expectation or assumptions about the public were wrong, as happened in the past, the 
plans which were developed will not work as expected. The best example was the 
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tragedy of flood in Kuantan, Pahang. The state capital was almost paralyzed, and many 
victims evacuated to flood relief centers. The help was delayed, and several relief 
centers were experiencing problems in food supply and other necessities as they had 
been cut off due to the floods. Fresh and clean water and electricity supply have been 
cut off in most areas in Kuantan while roads in and around the town were inundated 
by up to one meter of water (The Sundaily, 2014). This kind of scenario was not 
supposed to happen because we had experienced several floods almost every year.  The 
government or authorities themselves claimed that they have SOP, experiences, and 
expertise in dealing with this seasonal monsoon. If everything was put in order, this 
mistake should not have repeatedly happened. Our best explanation for such a situation 
was, this could be due to assumptions made by the government that went wrong. 
 
A poor planning could put our public in a dangerous situation. They are 
supposed to be protected but will be exposed to unnecessary injuries or problems. In 
view of the importance of public perception in defining the success of terrorism SOP 
action plans, the present researcher strongly believes the following issues noted below 
are very important in the planning and assisting the public to develop a good action 
plan: 
• How would communities or Malaysia public react in the event of a 
terrorist attack? 
• Problem or issue that they concern during that event. 
• The reasons to support them to do what they are told to do in such an 
event and whether the terrorist attack could make them feel unsafe and 
are they ready? 
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It can be assumed that the level of readiness, reaction, and willingness towards 
antiterrorism among Malaysian from this study or survey can help the government to 
have the source of information or opinion from on-ground users towards a campaign 
against terrorism. Based on that kind information, the government may produce a plan 
of action against terrorism which is developed accordingly to our norm of life and can 
function well during the implementation phase.  
 
1.5 Research Question 
1. Is there any tool to determine the level of readiness, reaction, and 
willingness towards antiterrorism among the community? 
2. What are the levels of readiness, reaction, and willingness among 
community towards antiterrorism and is there any difference in readiness, 
reaction, and willingness between rural and urban setting? 
3. Is there any association of socio-demography variables with the level of 
readiness, reaction, and willingness among community towards 
terrorism? 
4. Can community readiness, reaction, and willingness be improved by 
using educational material intervention? 
 
1.6 Null hypotheses  
1. Community readiness, reaction, and willingness in two difference 
geographical setting [urban (Kota Bharu) and rural (Gua Musang)] 
towards antiterrorism threat are not similar. 
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2. Socio-demographic variables are not associated with the level of 
readiness, reaction, and willingness among the community in Kota Bharu 
and Gua Musang towards antiterrorism. 
3. Anti-terrorism educational material is not effective to educate the 
community in Kota Bharu and Gua Musang. 
4. There are no other factors qualitatively contribute to the level of 
readiness, reaction, and willingness towards terrorism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
